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.IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------------STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 18,340

vs.
SANDRA J. TALBOT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with manslaughter: in
that on or about the 11th day of July, 1981, in violation of
Section 76-5-205, Utah Criminal Code, as amended, the defendant
did recklessly cause the death of Brandon Glen Talbot.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by jury in the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge,
presiding, on the 18th day of November, 1981.
defendant guilty as charged.

The jury found the

Defendant was sentenced by the

Court on February 26, 1982, to serve 1-15 years in the Utah State
Prison.

Notice of Appeal was filed on March 23, 1982.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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verdict of guilty entered in the District Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are those which were proved at trial
with the use of the defendant's statement.

On July 11, 1981,

Brandon Talbot (deceased) , awoke from sleep at approximately
10:30 a.m.

Sandra Talbot, mother of the deceased stated that

Brandon had been throwing temper tantrums for a period of several
weeks prior to July 11, 1981, and this day was no exception.
Therefore, when Brandon threw a tantrum Sandra put him back to
bed.

Brandon awake again at approximately 1:30 p.m.

Sandra gave

Brandon a piece of toast and put him on a kitchen chair.

Again

Brandon threw a temper tantrum, at which point Sandra hit the
child twice in the head with her hand.
and his head hit the table.

The child fell forward

The defendant, thereafter, began

loving the child and telling the child that she would never hit
him again.

After the child was calm, the child was put back in

the chair at the table.
Sandra went over to the television and started to adjust
it.

She turned around and noticed Brandon choking.

soon stopped choking.

However, he

Again she began adjusting the television

and again Brandon started choking.

When Sandra turned around the

second time, the child was falling off the chair onto the floor.
Sandra picked the child up and rushed next door to the neighbors,
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mr. and Mrs. Robert Scott.

Sandra told the Scott's that Brandon

was choking, and he was not breathing.

She also told them that

Brandon had fallen off the chair and had possibly hurt himself.
The Scott's and Sandra took Brandon to the Utah Valley Hospital
emergency entrance.

Whereupon, Doctors Robert Gray, Brent

Griffin and John Andrews attended to the child's medical needs
until the child's death on July 13, 1981, at approximately 7:30
a.m.
During examination and treatment of the child prior to its
death, pieces of toast were found lodged in its throat.

An

autopsy was performed on the body of the deceased by Dr. John
Wallace Graham (State Medical Examiner) to determine the cause of
death.

The cause of death was attributed to bilateral subdural

hematoma caused by a combination of several blows to the head.
All doctors testified that the blows could have been accidental.
Sandra Talbot was tried by a jury and was found guilty of
manslaughter.

Sentence was pronounced for one to fifteen years

in the State Prison.
The following facts were proved at trial without the use of
the defendant's statement. Sandra rushed next door to the neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Scott.

Sandra told the Scotts that

Brandon was choking, and he was not breathing.

She also told

them that Brandon had fallen off the chair and had possibly hurt
himself.

The Scotts and Sandra took Brandon to Utah Valley

Hospital emergency entrance.

Whereupon, Doctors Robert Gray,
-3-
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Brent Griffin and John Andrews attended to the child's medical
needs until the child's death on July 13, 1981, at approximately
7:30 a.m.

During examination and treatment of the child prior to

its death, pieces of toast were found lodged in its throat.
An autopsy was performed on the body of the deceased by Dr.
John Wallace Graham (State Medical Examiner) to determine the
cause of death.

The cause of death was attributed to bilateral

subdural hematoma caused by a combination of several blows to the
head.

All doctors testified that the blows could have been

accidental.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS
DELECTI OF MANSLAUGHTER AND THUS, THE INFORMATION
CHARGING THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED,
AND THE DEFENDANT DISCHARGED.
It is a fundamental principal of criminal law that an
accused cannot be convicted of a crime unless the prosecution can
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus delecti of the crime.
In the instant case, the defendant was charged with manslaughter
in that she recklessly caused the death of her son Brandon
Talbot.

In homocide cases such as this, the State must prove at

least two facts to establish the corpus delecti.

First the State

must prove the fact of the child's death and secondly the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child's death was
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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caused by means of criminal agency inflicted by the accused.
Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963): State v. Thatcher,
157 P.2d 258 (Utah, 1945)1 State v. Bassett, 495 P.2d 318 (Utah,
1972).
During the State's case, the State proved that the deceased,
Brandon Talbot, died as a result of bilateral subdural hematoma,
induced by several concussions on the brain.

To establish this

proof, the State called four medical doctors, the last of which
was the medical examiner for the State of Utah, Dr. John Wallace
Graham.

The first doctor to testify was Dr. Robert Nelson Gray,

a physician who worked in the emergency room at the Utah Valley
Hospital (R. 87).

Dr. Gray testified, over the objection of

defense counsel, that he had been told by the defendant that the
child (deceased) was sitting in a chair eating and fell from the
chair, began to vomit and then quit breathing.

When asked

whether his examination of the child revealed the physical evidence consistent with the defendant's statement, the doctor
replied in the affirmative (R. 98). · Upon being further examined
by both the Court and the prosecution, Dr. Gray testified that
the injury to the child's head, which was a fresh injury, was
consistent with the child falling from a chair and hitting a hard
object (R. 94).
The prosecution then called Dr. Brent Griffin, a pediatrician, who testified that he treated the child until its death. He
performed certain medical procedures in an attempt to restore the
-5-
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child to a state of consciousness (R. 100-116) •

On cross-

examination and on re-direct examination, Dr. Griffin testified
that he could not rule out accident as the cause of the injury to
the child's head and further stated that the child could fall
against something and receive the injury that was discovered to
be present on the child's head which in combination with other
bruises to the head was diagnosed as the eventual cause of death.
The State next called Dr. John M. Andrews, a neurologist,
who testified regarding his examination of the child, Brandon
Talbot, his diagnosis and conclusions regarding the injury and
injuries found on the child's head (R. 120-134).

On cross-

examination, Dr. Andrews, consistent with the previous doctors,
testified that he could not rule out accident as a cause of injury to the child's head (R. 136).
Finally, Dr. John Wallace Graham, the Utah State medical
examiner was called as a witness and testified of the cause of
death of the child and then gave his testimony regarding the
cause of injury.

Dr. Graham testified that the cause of death

was a head injury (R. 149).

Dr. Graham identified a total of

five bruises about the head area, one of which was a fresh
bruise, the others of which were between five and seven days old
as confirmed by testimony of the other doctors (R. 151).

Dr.

Graham further testified that the precise injury to the head
which occurred within two to three days of the child's death, by
itself, might not have caused the death of the child but that the
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injury acting in combination with other injuries on the child's
head would have caused the death of the child (R. 152-155).
Consistent with the other doctors' testimony, Dr. Graham
testified that the injury, which was determined to be the most
recent of the injuries could have been caused by the child falling against a hard object by accident.

Dr. Wallace Graham went

on to give his opinion that a total of five injuries could not
have been caused by accident, although he did not give any
medical reasons or other logical explanation for his conclusion
and opinion.
Thus, the State at the conclusion of testimony of the
doctors, and excluding any other testimony, proved only that the
life of Brandon Talbot had ended due to injuries received to the
head which injuries could have been the result of the child
falling accidently against a hard object or a hard object
accidently hitting the child's head.

None of the doctors could

rule out accident as a cause of injury, and the State Medical
Examiner stated that the injuries to the head eventually caused
his death.

The only evidence of the defendant's involvement in

the injuries, exclusive of her statement, was that the child had
fallen from a chair, had hit the floor, began choking and
vomiting and then quit breathing while it was in her custody and
care.

Thus, the State failed to prove a corpus delecti of the

crime charged.

That is, the State only proved that the death of

the baby was caused by injuries to the head, any one of which
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could have been caused by accident.

The State did not prove that

the injuries to the child were caused by a criminal means or
criminal agency inflicted by the defendant, Sandra Talbot.
In the case of State v. Bassett, 495 P.2d 318 (Utah 1972)
the Utah State Supreme Court faced a fact situation very similar
to the instant case.

In Bassett, the defendants Weldon Bassett

and Judy Bassett were found guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
The facts disclosed that on the 8th day of November, 1970, Erica,
the child of the defendants was taken to a hospital for treatment
of an ailment manifested by convulsions and a mild fever.

The

family physician examined the baby, performed certain medical examinations and treatment and released the child.

Thereafter, on

the 24th day of November, 1970, the child was again taken to the
hospital where she was pronounced dead.

An autopsy was performed

and it was found that the child had died from an acute and
chronic subdural hematoma.

The baby also had fractured ribs, but

these did not contribute to her death.
At the trial in the District Court, no evidence was produced
by the prosecution which showed that either of the defendants
committed any act or omission which resulted in the death of the
baby.

The Court submitted the case to the jury upon the theory

that the defendants, being parents of the deceased child and
being responsible for the child's protection, imposed upon them
the duty of using ordinary reasonable care for the child's safety.

The Court instructed the jury in effect that if the defen-8-
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dants were guilty of gross negligence in the care of the child in
such a manner as to evidence willful disregard for consequences;
and there being no circumstances amounting to a satisfactory excuse, and if fatal injury resulted from such lack of care, then
such acts or ommisions were a sufficient basis to find the defendants guilty.
The Court reversed the conviction of the defendants and
found as follows:
The State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the death of the child resulted proximately
from some act or omission on the part of defendants.
Even a showing of a mere thoughtless omission or slight
deviation from the norm of prudent conduct is insufficient
to support a finding of criminal negligence. In order to
make out a case under the statute above referred to, it is
incumbent upon the State to show an unlawful act or an
infraction which is done in marked disregard for the safety
of others. In this case, there being no evidence to show
any act on the part of the defendants or either one of them,
it was error for the Court to submit the case to the jury
and to permit the jury to speculate upon the guilt or
innocence of the defendants. The unfortunate death of the
baby from injuries suffered by her from a source not shown
by the evidence is insufficient on which to base a conviction.
In the instant case, the State did not prove that the death
of Brandon Talbot was caused by criminal agency or by any act or
omission committed by the defendant.

The State merely proved

that the child had five bruises to the head, one of which had
been inflicted within two to three days of its death and that the
combination of bruises caused the death of the child.

The

State's witnesses further testified that any one or more of the
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injuries to the head of the child could have been caused by
accident.

Thus, on its own, the State's evidence exclusive of

any statement of the defendant was insufficient to establish the
corpus delecti of the crime of manslaughter, and the Court, upon
motion of defense counsel, should have dismissed the information.
This Court has further stated that to constitute voluntary
manslaughter, there must be an intent to kill or do great bodily
harm, or do an act knowing the "natural and probable consequence
thereof will be death or great bodily harm."
396 P.2d 414 (Utah, 1964).

State v. Gallegos,

The State did not present evidence to

show or prove that the defendant performed any act knowing the
"natural or probable consequences" thereof would be death.

In

the case of People v. Strohm, 523 P.2d 973 (Colo., 1974), the
Colorado Supreme Court stated that:
The death could have been caused equally by accident or
by a felonious act. In the view of this evidence, the
inference of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be
rationally drawn.
In the instant case, the State's expert witnesses who testified
concerning the cause of injuries and the cause of death all
testified that the cause of injuries could have been by accident
and that the cause of death was a result of the injuries.

There

was no testimony on the part of the expert witnesses indicating
that the cause of the injuries or the death was by means of
criminal agency.

Thus, it is the contention of the defendant
-10-
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that on the authority of the case of State v. Bassett and other
cases cited herein, the information charging her with manslaughter should have been dismissed and she discharged.

POINT II:
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE STATEMENT OF THE
DEFENDANT SANDRA J. TALBOT.
During the prosecution ·of its case, the State called Officer
George Pierpont, a detective for the Provo police department who
testified that he responded to a request to investigate the death
of Brandon Talbot.

Mr. Pierpont contacted the defendant Sandra

Talbot and explained to her that he was a police officer and was
investigating the death of her son.

After his identification and

his declaration of the miranda rights to the defendant, he
interrogated her regarding her knowledge of the incidents leading
up to the death of her child (R. 138-144; 157-162).

When Mr.

Pierpont was prepared to recite in open Court the content of the
statement he had taken from the defendant, counsel for the defendant objected, upon the ground that the statement was inadmissable for the reason that the state had not proved the corpus
delecti of the offense of manslaughter and that until a corpus
delecti of the crime were established, the State could not use an
incriminating statement of the defendant.
At the outset of this brief, counsel took the liberty to
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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present two statements of facts, one including facts obtained
from the statement of the defendant and the other one excluding
those facts.

It is quite obvious that a brief reading of

counsel's two statements of facts together with the entire transcript of the record indicate that without the additional facts
contained in the statement of the defendant, there would be
absolutely no evidence of criminal agency involved in the causing
of the injuries and eventual death of the child Brandon Talbot.
Thus, it is easy to conclude that exclusive of the defendant's
own statement, the State failed to prove a corpus delecti of the
crime of manslaughter.
It is fundamental and basic law in the State of Utah and
other jurisdictions that a statement of an accused cannot be used
against the accused to establish the corpus delecti of a crime
and that said statement is excludable evidence until such time as
the state independently establishes the corpus delecti of the
offense charged.

State v. Pineda, 519 P.2d 41 (Ariz., 1974);

State v. Padilla, 474 P.2d 821 (Ariz., 1970); State v. Cooley,
603 P.2d 800 (Utah, 1979)
A reading of the transcript of the trial indicates that at
best the State proved, exclusive of the statement of the defendant that the child Brandon Talbot died as a result of injuries
to its head, which injuries caused a subdural hematoma.

All of

the expert witnesses testified that the injuries could have been
caused by accidental means.

None of the experts gave testimony
-12-
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based upon medical expertise that the child's injuries were
caused by criminal means or criminal agency.

However, with the

addition of the defendant's testimony that she slapped the child
twice causing the child's head to hit a table, the State was able
to adduce evidence that the defendant perhaps acted recklessly
and that her reckless actions under the criminal law caused her
to become criminally culpable for the death of her child.

It is

defendant's contention that even adding her statement to the
whole of the evidence, although defendant does not concede that
it was admissable, does not give sufficient evidence to prove
criminality in the cause of the injuries and eventual death of
the child.

That is, the striking of the child's head twice,

causing the child to fall against a table and nothing more, seems
wholey inadequate as evidence to persuade that the injuries were
caused by criminal means.
It should be noted that after the child's head struck the
table, it was completely calmed down and restored to a point
where it was eating toast which had been furnished by its mother.
That it was after such occurrance that the child began to choke
and because of choking apparently fell from the chair and struck
its head once again.
Defendant acknowledges that the jury has the right, if the
evidence is appropriately before it, to consider all of the facts
and evidence and make its determination of the verdict.

However,

the defendant does not believe that the jury should have been
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permitted to hear and consider her statement inasmuch as the
State had failed to prove the corpus delecti of the crime and
therefore under the rules of evidence should have been precluded
from introducing, and having admitted the statement given by the
defendant to Officer George Pierpont.
The defendant further contends that the Court erred in admitting the statement given by the defendant to George Pierpont
and that such error was not harmless and was the essential ingredient upon which the jury relied to enter a verdict of guilty.
Without her statement, the State's case would have failed.

Thus,

the Court committed reversable error and this defendant respectfully requests that this Court enter its order of reversal upon
her second point aforesaid.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL.
At the conclusion of the State's case, defense counsel made
a motion to the Court to enter an order of mistrial of the case
for the reason and upon the ground that the prosecutor in his
opening statement and during the course of trial repeatedly used
the words "death blow" and words of that kind in reference to the
actions of the defendant.

Counsel for the defendant maintained

and argued that the use of such words was highly inflammatory and
caused the jurors to form an attitude of prejudice against the
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant, unduly and unfairly, and that such actions of the prosecutor should have resulted in a mistrial of the case.
In the case of People v. Purvis, 384 P.2d 424 (Cal., 1963)
the California Court held that:
It has consistently been held that the official position
of the district attorney, as representative of the people,
carries such weight with the jury that his statements of
fact predicated on his knowledge, rather than on the
evidence, constitutes reversable error.
In the case of People v. Lyons, 303 P.2d 329 (Cal., 1956),
the Court stated that where the evidence in a case is closely
balanced and the guilt of the defendant has not been established,
the prosecution's misconduct may turn the scales against the defendant thus resulting in grounds for reversal or mistrial.

The

court further intimated that it is as much the prosecutor's duty
to refrain from improper methods to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to bring about a just one.
A

particular statement made by the prosecutor in the closing

paragraphs of his opening statement seems to be particularly
inflammatory and calculated to excite the jury unduly and unfairly against the defendant at the outset of the trial.

The state-

ment is as follows:
Now the charge today is a serious charge. Its manslaughter.
Manslaughter is always a very serious charge, because it
means that someone is dead. Nothing we do here today can
bring that person back to life. This particular case, the
facts are particularly tragic, because the person who is
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dead, his life was so short. His name was Brandon Glen
Talbot. He died when he was eighteen months old. Just a
child. Not much more than a baby with a very small
vocabulary. The tragedy of this case lies, not only in
the fact that the child was so young, but that the dea·th
blow was delivered by the child's mother, the defendant
in this particular case.

The prosecutor, after being admonished by the Court off the
record, used the words "death blow" a second time in the remainder of his opening statement.

The prosecutor's opening statement

is in the record at pages 79 through 80.

Counsel for the defen-

dant reserved his right to make additional arguments for mistrial
at the close of State's case.

Upon the close of State's case,

the defendant's counsel did move the Court for a mistrial of the
case upon the ground and for the reason that the prosecutor's
statements and use of the words "death blows" were inflammatory
and prejudicial (R. 176).

It is the defendant's position that

the conduct of the prosecutor in his opening statement created
sufficient prejudice against the defendant that the defendant had
grounds for mistrial of the case.

This is true particularly in

light of the fact that the prosecutor was not able to prove in
his case that the defendant did inflict "death blows" on the
child Brandon Talbot.
CONCLUSION
The corpus delecti of a case must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

The corpus delecti of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

slaughter includes proof of the death of the victim as well as
proof that the death was caused by criminal agency inflicted by
the accused.

In this case, the prosecution did not present

evidence which would lead a reasonable mind to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that criminal agency was the vehicle in causing
the injuries and eventual death of Brandon Talbot.
The Court admitted the statement of the defendant Sandra J.
Talbot over the objection of counsel, which statement should have
been excluded from the evidence until such time as the prosecution had introduced evidence supporting the corpus delecti of
the offense of manslaughter.

As previously contended, the State

failed to present evidence giving rise to the corpus delecti of
the crime of manslaughter and therefore it was error for the
Court to allow the statement of Sandra J. Talbot, the defendant
to be admitted as evidence.
Finally, the prosecutor, in his eagerness to obtain the conviction of the defendant in this case used inflammatory and prejudicial statements in his opening argument which incited a
prejudice in the minds of the jury against the defendant unduly
and unfairly and which should have resulted in a mistrial of the
case.
Respectfully submitted this

)f.:f:!::aay

of October, 1982.

ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

T

Defendant-Appellant
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